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Abstract: The Nordic countries represent an institutional setting with tax-based 
health care financing and universal access to health care services. Very few health 
care services are excluded from what are offered within the publically financed 
health care system. User fees are often non-existing or low and capped. 
Nevertheless, the markets for voluntary private health insurance (VPHI) have been 
rapidly expanding. In this paper we describe the development of the market for 
VPHI in the Nordic countries. We outline similarities and differences and provide 
discussion of the rationale for the existence of different types of VPHI. Data is 
collected on the population covered by VPHI, type and scope of coverage, suppliers 
of VPHI and their relations with health providers. It seems that the main roles of 
VPHI are to cover out-of-pocket payments for services that are only partly financed 
by the public health care system (complementary), and to provide preferential 
access to treatments that are also available free of charge within the public health 
care system, but often with some waiting time (duplicate). 
 
JEL classification: I11, I13 
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1 Introduction 
The Nordic countries are well known for their welfare states. An important feature of the 
welfare state ethos is easy and equal access to adequate healthcare for the whole population. 
Very few services are defined outside the public health care system, the user co-payments 
are relatively low and complemented with an annual high-cost ceiling. Instead of using 
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financial incentives to reduce demand the health care systems have been characterized by 
rationing by waiting time and gate-keeping to specialized care.  
In spite of the apparent similarities of the Nordic health care systems, there are 
differences between the countries in terms of governance/organization and financing of the 
health services.1  
The Finnish public health system is built on three parts: The first part is a tax funded 
system run by the municipalities with public and some outsourced private providers. 
Specialist care is provided by 20 regional providers, hospital districts. The second part is an 
obligatory public health insurance (PHI) based system reimbursing the use of privately 
provided health services. It covers all permanent residents in Finland. The PHI funded 
system mainly provides services that are duplicate to the tax funded services. Waiting times 
are either non-existent or much shorter than in the tax funded system, but co-payments are 
significantly higher. The third part is that employers are obliged to organize preventive 
occupational health care services for their employees. Many employers also purchase 
medical outpatient services for their staff. These services are reimbursed partly by National 
Health Insurance. Occupational health care services, unlike other first contact services in 
Finland, are free of charge for the users. 
Norway is characterized by a semi-decentralized health care system. The 
municipalities hold responsibility for primary care while the central government, 
represented by four regional health authorities, governs specialist care. Both primary and 
specialized care are tax funded.  
Denmark also has a semi-centralized health care system. Since 2007 specialized care 
is mainly provided by hospitals owned and run by five regions. General practitioners and 
practicing specialists are privately owned, but operate under general contracts with the 
regions and receive most of their income from public sources generated by taxation at the 
state and municipal levels. Both general and practicing specialists are subject to regional 
planning in terms of the number and location of practices.  
In Sweden the responsibility for financing and provision of health services lies at the 
county councils/regions, while municipalities are required to provide care for the aged and 
disabled. Most health care is financed through local taxation, and contrary to Denmark and 
Norway, county councils have the right to collect their own taxes.  
Access to specialist care in Denmark and Norway is controlled by gatekeeping. That 
is, by general practitioners that refer patients to the specialists. In Sweden, the majority of 
county councils do not formally require referrals to enter specialized care, although patients 
are encouraged to seek primary care first. In Finland referrals are not required if a person 
visits the private sector specialists (PHI system). 
As the populations in the Nordic countries have become older and richer, demand 
for, and expenditure of, health care has grown more than the increase in resources. 
Governments in the Nordic countries have introduced reforms on both the demand side and 
the supply side of the health care sector to cope with limited capacity and long waiting times.  
On the supply side, increased funding to health care, waiting-time guarantees and 
prospective reimbursement, such as activity-based financing using diagnoses-related 
groups, are some of the policies that have been introduced. However, these policies have 
generally been unsuccessful in bringing down waiting times. Even policies of activity-based 
financing do not necessarily decrease waiting times, although hospital productivity 
                                                 
1 We use the term Nordic countries, even though we only include Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden in 
the overview that follows. The reason that Iceland is not included is that voluntary private health insurance is 
hardly existing on Iceland. According to the OECD Health Statistics (2015), 0,2% of the population on Iceland 
were covered by private health insurance. 
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generally increases (Siciliani et al, 2013). Introduction of activity-based financing is 
however a key component in introducing choice and competition, which may in itself reduce 
waiting times. In addition choice and competition will increase the inhabitants’ option of 
providers, and may utilize capacity available in the private sector. 
The demand side reforms typically imply increased out-of-pocket payments and 
increased cost-sharing for services that are partly covered by the public system. The main 
rationale, in addition to contain public expenditure expansion, has been to make people more 
aware of the cost of medical services thus preventing overutilization. In addition, increased 
out-of-pocket payments for (price-inelastic) services will also increase the financial 
resources available for the health care sector. The other demand side policy approach has 
been to shift demand to the private sector. One example of such a policy is to stimulate the 
growth of voluntary private health insurances (VPHI) by introducing tax incentives for 
employees and employers. 
The VPHI schemes that are introduced in the Nordic countries are mainly 
complementary or duplicate in relation to the public health care system. That is, the VPHI 
schemes cover out-of-pocket payments for services that are only partly financed by the 
public health care system (complementary), or they provide preferential access to treatments 
that are also available free of charge within the public health care system, but often with 
some waiting time (duplicate). In addition some of the VPHI schemes also offer 
supplementary health services. That is, services not covered by the public health care system 
(OECD, 2004). 
The purpose of this paper is to describe the development of the VPHI in the Nordic 
countries. We will highlight similarities and differences related to population coverage, the 
type and scope of coverage, the suppliers of VPHI and their relationship with health care 
providers. Furthermore we will outline whether tax-policies have been introduced to 
promote VPHI. We provide discussion of the rationale for the existence of different types 
of the VPHI. Finally we indicate possible avenues for future research related to VPHI in the 
Nordic countries.  
2 Potential benefits and drawbacks of VPHI  
One of the main benefits of VPHI is that it may shift demand from the public health care 
sector to the private sector. In this case VPHI might increase available capacity, reducing 
waiting times and releasing financial pressure from the public system since those with 
private insurance will cover some of the medical expenses themselves. In addition, VPHI 
may demonstrate more flexibility and responsiveness to population needs and preferences 
by providing patients with faster access and increased choice of providers. VPHI may also 
provide access to services excluded from the public coverage. Private insurers can provide 
patients with effective guidance trough complicated health care system and promote more 
efficient utilization of available capacity in the public and private sectors. Finally, it can 
lead to more dynamic and competitive market with a higher degree of innovation; improve 
efficiency, quality and sustainability of the public system and enhance access (Colombo and 
Tapay, 2004). 
In spite of the number of potential positive consequences, these effects have not yet 
been consistently demonstrated (Sagan and Thomson 2015). Moreover, there are concerns 
and challenges associated with the expansion of private sector health services that need to 
be addressed. VPHI may reduce capacity by crowding out resources from the public system. 
It may lead to distortion in resource allocation and priorities, and result in overutilization of 
services. These concerns are particularly relevant when there is a limited supply of 
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physicians and borders between public and private systems are not clearly defined 
(Mossialos and Thomson, 2004).  
Competitive market environments may further increase pressure on the public 
system if VPHI gives insurers and private providers opportunities for risk selection thus 
leaving the public sector with patients that require more costly treatments. VPHI may also 
work against the policy goal of making patients/physicians more conscious of the use of 
services thus potentially resulting in excessive utilization of services.  
The expansion of VPHI in the Nordic countries, as well as in other countries with 
national health care systems, has been subject to debate as VPHI is often bought by 
individuals of higher socioeconomic status (see e.g. Kiil (2012)). In this respect, VPHI can 
lead to medical care divided by social class (Manifest, 2009) and priorities determined by 
the individuals’ financial/insurance status. It is also argued that higher income groups (that 
purchase VPHI and pay taxes) might be less motivated to contribute to the public system in 
the future. 
Despite that expansion of VPHI has a potential for addressing the current challenges 
in the Nordic health care systems and in theory sounds promising, it is important to be aware 
of its potential negative effects and monitor its development to ensure that it does not violate 
important societal goals such as equity and solidarity and does not adversely affect 
efficiency, coordination and sustainability of the public system. 
3 The institutional framework of VPHI 
In the following we will present data on the population covered, type and scope of coverage, 
suppliers of VPHI and their relationship with health care providers for Finland, Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden.  
3.1 Population covered with VPHI 
The market for VPHI has grown significantly in the Nordic countries. Currently about 20 % 
of the population in Finland is covered by VPHI. The corresponding numbers for Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden are respectively 51 %, 9 % and 7 %.  
According to the Finnish Federation of Financial Services 438 421 children had 
private insurance for health care costs, 363 382 adults had private insurance and 171 007 
had private insurance through an employer in 2013 (FFFS 2013).2 The growth has been 
significant the latter years.3  
In Norway, the market for VPHI was almost non-existent until the beginning of the 
millennium. Since then the market has rapidly expanded. In 2015, 472 000 individuals were 
covered (Finans Norge, 2015a). Collective/group policies constitute around 90 %, while 
10 % are individual policies.  
In Sweden, 626 000 people had VPHI at the end of 2015. This is an increase from 
218 000 in 2006. 72 % of insurance policies were paid by the employer. The remaining 
policies were divided between individually purchased, 5 %, and group policies, 23 % 
(Svensk Försäkring, 2015). Group policies, which contributes to the most of the market 
expansion in recent years, are signed by employers, unions or other member organizations, 
but paid by individuals.   
                                                 
2 In the first survey of health insurance in Finland it is estimated that 22.7 % of Finnish adults and 52 % of the 
children had private health insurance. Of the insured adults, 74.8 % had self-purchased health insurance, 
16.2 % employer-purchased health insurance and 9 % both, Valtonen et al. (2014). 
3 In 2005, 375 000 children and 237 000 adults had voluntary private health insurance, Vuorenkoski (2008). 
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In Denmark, complementary VPHI has played a significant role since the early 
1970s while duplicate VPHI is a more recent phenomenon.4 Complimentary insurance was 
held by 2.3 million Danes in 2014 (Health insurance ‘danmark’, Annual report 2014). 
The number of inhabitants with duplicate treatment insurance has increased from 
230 000 in 2003 to 2 million in 2014. In most cases (about 75 %) duplicate insurance is part 
of an employment contract. The number of persons covered by individual policies is low 
and decreasing (from 4 % in 2003 to 1.8 % in 2013). The remaining (23.5%) are covered 
by treatment insurance contracts where partners and children are co-insured (Forsikring & 
Pension, 2014a).  
About 37 % of those with complementary VPHI also had medical treatment 
insurance. It is therefore estimated that 2.9 million inhabitants were covered by private 
health insurance, CEPOS (2014). 
3.2 Type and scope of coverage 
3.2.1 Complementary VPHI 
Complementary VPHI plays a significant role in Finland and Denmark, while in Norway 
and Sweden this type of coverage is almost non-existent. Complementary health insurance 
is defined as private health insurance that complements coverage of the public sector 
services by covering all or part of the residual costs not otherwise reimbursed (OECD, 
2015).  
A distinct feature of the complementary insurance in Finland is that it can provide a 
faster access to primary5 and secondary care level ambulatory services and direct access to 
a specialist without a referral from GP6. In other Nordic countries primary care is usually 
excluded from the coverage. In Finland, VPHI is largely complementary to the use of 
privately provided health services reimbursed by the obligatory PHI based system through 
which the visits, diagnostic and treatment services, and prescription drugs are reimbursed 
to a small extent. However, while VPHI is mostly used to cover the high co-copayments in 
the PHI reimbursed system it usually covers also co-payments in the municipal primary care 
centers and public hospitals. 
The complementary insurance in Denmark covers co-payments for pharmaceuticals, 
and services such as adult dental services, glasses and contact lenses, and physiotherapy 
(Pedersen, 2005). The total compensations related to complementary co-payment insurance 
in Denmark amounted to 2 649 million Danish kroner (€355 mill.) in 2014, compared to 
around 25 000 million Danish Kroner in total private user payments.  
3.2.2 Duplicate VPHI 
Duplicate private coverage exists in all Nordic countries. It plays a major role in Norway 
and Sweden. Duplicate VPHI offers coverage for health services already included under 
government health insurance, while also offering access to different providers (e.g., private 
hospitals) or levels of service (e.g., faster access to care). It does not exempt individuals 
from contributing to government health coverage programs, OECD (2015). 
                                                 
4 Duplicate insurance is called supplementary in Denmark and includes both duplicate and supplementary 
services. The information and numbers below are for treatment insurance that covers both types of services. 
5 With VPHI patients can access private sector in which there are doctors that can be seen as parallel to GPs 
in a sense that they are either not specialists or they are specialists in general practice. Most of the doctors 
working in the private sector are however specialists in other than general practice. The access in turn 
resembles the primary care in a sense that it is the place for first-contact-care. The physicians in the private 
sector can also refer patients to public hospitals which also features primary care.   
6 The direct access applies only to those specialists working in the private sector. 
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As already described, in Finland, use of private health services is partly reimbursed 
by the obligatory public health insurance. This system is often duplicate to the municipal 
system but it offers better access to care and often also a direct access to a specialist. In 
addition, the use of the private services partly reimbursed from the PHI allows the choice 
of a doctor and provider organization in the private sector. However, the co-payments are 
relatively high since PHI is covering only around 20-30% of the costs. Hence, by purchasing 
a VPHI the individual can have more affordable services compared to PHI but also better 
access compared to the municipal system. However, not all services are included in VPHI. 
Services that are often excluded include prenatal examinations, terminations, delivery, 
fertility treatment, contraception, visual examinations and treatment of refractive error, 
vaccinations, vitamins or other health foods and nutrients, esthetic surgery, treatment of 
virility and ‘alternative’ treatments. The insurance companies may exclude treatment of 
specific diseases on the basis of individual exclusion criteria. This is usually based on the 
case history of the insured person, i.e. existing medical conditions before purchase of VPHI 
are usually excluded. Typical conditions that are excluded at purchase are type one diabetes 
and other chronic diseases. For children, conditions such as congenital medical conditions 
and disabilities may be excluded.  
In Denmark there are several types of VPHI. The majority of policies provide faster 
access to specialist diagnosis and treatment services that are also available in the public 
system. They cover expenses for examinations and treatments (including surgery and 
medicines) at private hospitals, preventive services by physiotherapists and chiropractors, 
and general health examinations. Around 33% of all policies are less comprehensive, and 
only cover diagnostic and preventive services. Most policies do not cover ongoing 
medication for chronic conditions, but do cover medication related to acute treatment 
episodes and some follow up (Interview with “Forsikring og Pension”, 7January 27, 2016).  
Policies on exclusion of products vary between companies, but generally all 
treatments that are covered in the public sector and can lead to sustained health benefits are 
covered (interview with “Forsikring og Pension”, January 27 2016). Most collective policies 
exclude medication for chronic conditions and/or define a specific period (12-24 months) 
before coverage starts for preexisting conditions. Cosmetic surgery is typically excluded as 
in the public system, and infertility treatment is excluded or subject to limitations.   
VPHI in Denmark increases the choice of provider, but the choice can be limited to 
the provider network that is associated with a particular insurer. As a rule a referral is 
required to access specialist care in Denmark. However, some private insurance policies do 
not require referrals. In Denmark there is also an option in the public system to select a 
coverage scheme that provides direct access to privately practicing specialists. Patients 
within this scheme receive reimbursement up to the level of public fees, but must pay an 
additional fee. 
In Norway, VPHI provides the insured guaranteed access to medical examination or 
treatment by a specialist physician/elective surgery within a specified time frame. VPHI 
typically covers diagnostics, examinations, specialist consultations and treatments, 
hospitalizations and elective surgeries as well as rehabilitation. In addition, physiotherapy 
and psychological treatment can be included. VPHI will typically not include emergency 
treatments, treatments at public facilities like hospitals and primary care centers, psychiatric 
treatment, dental treatment, addictions related to alcohol, drugs, sleep agents or narcotic 
substances, pregnancy-related treatments, deliveries, abortion and sterilization, infertility 
treatments, sleep-related treatment, obesity, cosmetic treatments, examination and treatment 
related to vision as well as vision and hearing aids, vaccination and preventive examination. 
                                                 
7 “Forsikring og Pension” is the business association for private insurance and pension providers in Denmark.  
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In addition, VPHI will typically not cover services that are excluded from the public 
coverage. Most insurers exclude preexisting conditions and define a specific period between 
the purchase of VPHI and the time from which coverage starts to apply. This is particularly 
the case for individual policies and small groups policies.  
In Norway VPHI increases the choice of providers in specialist care. However, the 
choice of provider is usually restricted to the provider network that a particular insurance 
company has established a collaboration with. Insurance companies usually have a service 
unit that looks for available capacity and coordinate all patients’ treatment activities. In 
cases when there is a lack of capacity or competence, provider networks can be expanded. 
As a rule insurance companies in Norway also require referral from a primary care physician 
to access secondary/specialist care. In some cases, the insured will have an opportunity to 
receive a ‘second opinion’, particularly in case of life-threatening conditions or a risky 
treatment. 
One company in Norway ‘Vertikal Helse’ offers a special mediation service that is 
included in the health insurance package they offer. This service is unique since it provides 
assistance within a wide range of services, including those not covered by the insurance, to 
find the most appropriate and competent health care provider. The search will include both 
public and private providers in Norway as well as providers in the Nordic countries and 
Europe. Those who buy this type of service can get discounted prices for medical services 
within the insurers’ provider network. 
In Sweden, VPHI typically covers health care advice, care planning and coordination 
and specialist care with a focus on elective surgeries and rehabilitation (Svensk Försäkring, 
2013). Many insurance companies are also offering preventive care to increase health and 
wellbeing among employees and to prevent sickness absents. Examples of such services 
include programs to reduce stress and support changes towards a healthy lifestyle, and 
counseling from behavioral therapists or psychologists. Private insurers in Sweden follow 
similar practices on exclusion of treatments as Norwegian insurers. The main services that 
are excluded relate to acute treatment and highly specialized services. Insurers in Sweden 
may exclude preexisting conditions. The choice of a health care provider is usually limited 
to private providers within the insurer’s network and can be also restricted to the providers 
that operate in Sweden. VPHI in Sweden (in contrast to Norway) does not require a referral 
from a GP to access specialist care, thus potentially removing barriers to direct access to a 
specialist care. Instead, care planning is often carried out through a triage function over the 
phone. 
Co-payments for services provided through VPHI vary both within and between the 
countries. In Finland there are different arrangements for co-payments. The most common 
are: i) periodical co-payment that has to be covered out-of-pocket each policy period 
(usually a year); ii) disease related co-payment that is charged once per treated 
disease/condition; iii) co-payment that is charged every time reimbursement is claimed from 
an insurance company; iv) no-copayments. (The Finnish Financial Ombudsman Bureu 
2014.).  
In Norway, co-payments in the private sector may depend on the health insurance 
agreement/policy, but many insurers do not require copayments. Only a few policies in 
Denmark require co-payments. The insurance companies have attempted to introduce a 
deductible, but with limited success and competition has largely eliminated this (Interview 
with “Forsikring and Pension, January 27 2016).  
In Sweden individuals are often required to pay co-payment for use of services. The 
level of co-payments varies but has generally increased in recent years (Skoglund, 2012). A 
common practice is that individuals pay 500 SEK or more in copayments for the first visit 
in a healthcare episode.  
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3.2.3 Supplementary VPHI 
The role of supplementary insurance is relative small in the Nordic countries. It provides 
coverage for additional health services not at all covered by the government/social 
scheme, OECD (2015). 
In Finland VPHI has a very small supplementary element as some policies include 
services not covered by the publicly funded system. These include travelers’ travel costs 
from outside Finland and policies concerning some luxury products. A part of VPHI 
policies only cover services needed due to sports accidents – these are marketed in 
cooperation with sports associations. For a number of sport activities, active participation 
is even conditional to having this kind of VPHI. 
A slowly growing number of VPHIs in Finland are offered to employers to cover for 
employees or “key” employees services that are not accepted medical services covered by 
the PHI funds according to the occupational health law. Another group of people targeted 
by VPHI is people at the “third age”, leaving the coverage offered by occupational health. 
There are also certain sickness specific insurance products such as cancer insurances.  
In Denmark supplementary health insurance is an integrated part of many 
commercial and non-commercial policies, but to varying degrees. It typically covers 
services in situations where the public sector does not cover, such as some types of 
physiotherapy, psychological therapy e.g. for stress related conditions and health check-ups. 
In Norway supplementary VPHI hardly exists. If it is provided it is related to dental 
treatment for collective policies, gambling, drug and alcohol addiction, and some additional 
types of alternative treatments (e.g. acupuncture) provided by authorized personnel.  
In Sweden supplementary services exist mainly for adult dental services. In 
exchange for a monthly risk-adjusted fee, individuals are offered dental care services free 
of charge. This supplementary service is usually offered at public dental clinics 
(Folktandvården) and are less common among private dental practices. The insurance 
covers general examinations, acute services and treatment of caries and tooth loss. Services 
such as tooth replacements, orthodontics and tooth whitening are not included. About 
200.000 individuals had this insurance in 2011 and it is more common among young adults 
(Försäkringskassan 2012). 
3.3 Suppliers of VPHI 8 
The major actors operating in the Finnish VPHI market are OP-Pohjola-group (31.7 %), 
LähiTapiola-group (24.9 %), If (24.7 %), and Fennia (9.8%). All are for-profit companies. 
In addition a few smaller companies are active (The Federation of Finnish Financial 
Services 2015). 
In Denmark, complementary VPHI is offered by the non-profit health insurer 
‘danmark’. This company had around 2.3 million members in 2014 (Sygeforsikring 
‘danmark’ annual report 2014). Duplicate VPHI is mainly provided by commercial stock–
based insurance companies. In addition, the non-profit insurer ‘danmark’ offers some 
policies with reimbursement of some expenses for elective surgeries at private hospitals. 
The companies that provide private health insurance in Denmark include PFA Pension (incl. 
Mølholm Insurance) (33.2 %), Tryg (13.4 %), Danica (12.1 %), Skandia (10.1 %), Codan 
(9.8 %), If (7.4 %), PensionDanmark (7.3 %), Topdanmark (6.6 %), Forsikring & Pension 
(2014b). 
The providers that offer VPHI in Norway are mainly for-profit insurance companies. 
The major actors operating in Norwegian market are: Codan Forsikring/Vertikal 
                                                 
8 The percentages in this section indicate market shares in 2014. 
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Helseassistanse (32.6 %), Storebrand Helseforsikring (18 %), If NUF (16.7 %), Gjensidige 
Forsikring (13.6 %) Tryg Forsikring (11%) and SpareBank 1 (7.7 %) (Finans Norge, 2014). 
About 15 insurance companies are presently offering VPHI in Sweden. The number 
of VPHI products on the market is higher, however, as insurance companies usually offer 
more than one policy with differences in services covered, restrictions and deductibles. The 
four main actors in Sweden9 are Trygg-Hansa (38%), Länsförsäkringar (19%), Folksam 
(20%) and If (11%). Länsförsäkringar and Folksam are customer-owned companies, while 
Trygg-Hansa and If are for-profit companies.   
3.4 The relationship between suppliers of VPHI and health care providers 
3.4.1 Payment to private health providers  
In Finland, policy holders usually disburse the expenditures and are reimbursed by insurers 
afterwards. In cases of expensive treatments the insurers usually pay directly to the private 
provider. In these cases the insurance company typically requires a preliminary approval of 
the treatments. Some insurance companies – such as LähiTapiola – have signed contracts 
with direct payment to private providers so the insured do not have to pay out-of-pocket.  
In Norway privately insured patients usually pay for specialist consultations/services 
received through the insurers’ provider network. They are later reimbursed by insurers. In 
some cases the insurers pay directly to the private providers. ‘Storebrand Helseforsikring’ 
for example pays directly to private providers (i.e. hospital or rehabilitation institution) in 
case of hospitalization (with and without surgery) as well as for cancer treatment.  
In Denmark most policies do not require patients to pay out of pocket. This has 
changed over time in response to consumer preferences (interview with “Forsikring og 
Pension”, January 27, 2016). Insurers do not provide access to detailed information about 
their contracts with providers as this is subject to competition.  
In Sweden providers are usually paid directly from insurance companies, excluding 
deductibles that may be paid directly by individuals at the point of service. Insurance 
companies typically require approval of expensive diagnostic services and treatments. 
3.4.2 Contracting with private health providers 
Contracting between insurance companies and private providers is not common in Finland. 
The basic orientation is reimbursement. This is particularly true when it comes to 
reimbursement of private outpatient services.  
However, there seems to be a movement towards stricter cost control of prices for 
surgeries and expensive diagnostic procedures. Some policies require that a patient only 
uses providers accepted by the insurance company. Should the patient use another provider 
(s)he has to cover the additional costs out-of-pocket. OP-Pohjola has established its own 
hospital (Omasairaala), and is further expanding by establishing a hospital chain in which 
their insured patients will be treated. The aim is to treat especially the high cost VPHI 
patients (e.g. surgery) in these hospitals. In this way OP-Pohjola is probably aiming at a 
better control over the costs of (inpatient) care.   
In Norway, private health insurers usually selectively contract private health 
providers in Norway and the other Nordic countries. The choice of providers is based on 
their expertise, quality, available capacity and prices. However, the selective contracting 
might be limited as for-profit hospitals do not provide all kinds of treatment. When there is 
                                                 
9 The market shares within brackets refers to “sjukvård och olycksfall” (health and accident insurance) i.e. a 
broader category of insurance including VPHI. However, these four actors is responsible for most of the 
market, and they are often referred to in comparisons between VPHI products. 
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lack of capacity or competence in the Nordic countries, the insurance companies will 
include providers within their European network (preferably from the closest countries). 
Prices are set through negotiations with providers and tendering. Payments are based 
on the services that are approved in long-term contracts. As a rule, insurers require that 
patients have a referral (some insurers specify that doctors have to practice in the Nordic 
countries). Moreover, insurers stipulate that all examinations and treatment expenses have 
to be approved in advance by the insurance company, and treatment must be performed in 
private hospitals within insurers’ provider network. Policy holders receive assistance from 
trained medical personnel to make appointments with an appropriate specialist and to 
coordinate care. Through this process insurance companies also ensure that patients receive 
approved/reimbursable treatment at providers with which they have an agreement. 
Private insurers operating in Denmark usually contract selectively, but this is limited 
due to the relatively few private hospitals and clinics in many specialty areas. Some contract 
with suppliers abroad. The choice of providers is based on expertise, quality, available 
capacity and prices. Insurance companies do not provide access to detailed information 
about contracts and negotiated prices as this is subject to competition (interview with 
“Forsikring og Pension”, January 27, 2016). 
In Sweden, private insurers contract selectively with private providers and select 
providers on the basis of their competence, capacity, prices and quality. In some cases 
private providers are offering their services to county councils, and private insurance 
companies buy surplus capacity. In other cases private providers are oriented exclusively 
towards the market for VPHI patients. Increasingly, insurance companies are working with 
a selected network of providers and are developing contracts to align incentives regarding 
both costs and quality. 
4 Tax-policies to promote VPHI 
The governments in Denmark and Norway have introduced tax-incentives to promote 
expansion of employment-based VPHI in 2002/2003. Later, the majority of these tax-
incentives were abolished mainly due to changes in the political majority and the new 
majorities concern for equity. 
In Norway, tax incentives were introduced in 2003. These tax incentives triggered 
the first wave of growth of the VPHI market. The incentives gave employers and employees 
tax exemption on private health insurance. Employees were given a tax exemption on the 
benefit of having medical treatment expenses covered by employer, and employers could 
deduct the medical expenses on their social security contributions. The tax agreement were 
conditional on the following conditions. First, only medical treatment aimed at diagnostics, 
treatments and rehabilitation provided by authorized health personnel were included. Hence, 
medical services aimed at prevention, cosmetics and infertility treatments were excluded. 
Second, only treatments that took place in private facilities not financed by the public were 
included. Third, the tax exemptions only applied to hospital treatment and treatment that 
would be otherwise reimbursable in the public system. Finally, the tax exemption were only 
applicable to expenses for treatment and hotel services at treatment facilities, the 
corresponding travel expenses, the medical follow-up and rehabilitation provided by health 
personnel and conditioned on the referral from a doctor (Finansdepartementet 2003). The 
tax incentives were removed in 2006 after the 2005 Parliament election that gave a Center-
Left majority. In 2010 a proposal to reintroduce tax-exemption for employment-based VPHI 
was rejected (Representantforslag 41S 2009-2010). Currently, employment-provided health 
insurance in Norway is subject to tax on benefit as it was before the introduction of tax 
exemptions. 
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In Denmark tax exemptions for employer-paid private insurance were introduced in 
2002. Tax exemptions were applicable to treatment of employees in case of illness and 
accidents including psychiatric treatment and preventive treatment. It was conditioned on 
the coverage of all employees in the firms and a referral from a doctor. Cosmetic treatments 
and infertility treatments were excluded from the tax exemption (Copenhagen Economics, 
2008). The tax exemptions resulted in substantial growth of market for supplementary 
employer-financed private health insurance (CEPOS 2014). In 2012, the majority of the tax 
exemptions for employment-based private health insurance were abolished10 (Skat, 2012) 
mainly to address concerns related to equity. Employment-paid private health insurance is 
now taxed as a benefit for the employee with few exceptions. Surprisingly this has not led 
to a reduction in the number of Danes covered by VPHI after 2012. 
Neither the Finnish nor the Swedish government have introduced specific tax 
policies targeted at stimulating the take up of the employment based VPHI. However, in 
Finland some tax incentives exist for group policies since private insurance is not taxed as 
a benefit for employees if it applies to all employees in a firm. The insurance costs of the 
employer are deducted from the taxable profit of the company (when all employees are 
insured). 
In Sweden there is no tax on benefit from having employer-paid private health 
insurance. The same rule applies irrespective of all the employees are covered or only a few. 
However, if the benefit also covers deductibles for the use of services, including co-
payments to publicly finances services, a small taxable benefit for the employee exists equal 
to 3 per cent of the annual premium. Insurance signed by the employer can also be paid by 
individual employees as a reduction of their income before taxes. If so, the insurance is a 
taxable benefit for the individual. From the employer perspective, premiums for VPHI are 
a non-deductible expense. 
5 Discussion and conclusions 
The data presented in this paper indicate that VPHI in the Nordic countries play two main 
roles in relation to the public health care system; a complementary and a duplicate role. 
Interestingly, both types of insurance are meant to cover risks that are perceived to be low, 
namely co-payments for public services and worsened health conditions due to late access 
to care within the public system 
Complementary VPHI plays a significant role in Denmark and in Finland, but does 
not exist in Norway and Sweden. In Denmark it is aimed at reimbursement of services for 
which high co-payments in public system exist (dentistry, pharmaceuticals, glasses, some 
types of physiotherapy). Historically such payments were covered by the sickness fund 
system. When this system was abolished in 1973, it opened up a market that the non-profit 
insurance company ‘danmark’ filled. Since then, it has grown to be one of the largest 
companies in Denmark, and it provides individual insurance policies to cover co-payments 
within health care.  
A similar situation occurs in Finland where the main reason for buying 
complementary VPHI is the low reimbursement rate of the obligatory public health 
insurance for medical diagnostics and treatments in the private sector. When public health 
insurance was introduced in 1964, the average reimbursement rate was set at 60 % of the 
expenditures. Since the legal (reimbursement) rate is not directly related to the actual prices, 
but instead to an administratively determined “reimbursement rate”, it has been possible to 
                                                 
10 Exceptions include expenses for prevention and work-related medical problems as well as treatment related 
to alcohol and drug abuse under condition that it is offered to all employees in the firm and a referral from a 
doctor. 
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lower the real reimbursement rate gradually without the political troubles of changing the 
law. Currently, the average real reimbursement rate is around 25 % of the expenditures. 
Interestingly, the function of the Finnish VPHI is largely complementary to the PHI funded 
system (by covering the high copayments), but at the same time duplicate to the tax funded 
system as the PHI offers direct access to specialists, and often with less waiting. In the public 
sector there is a lack of availability for services such as rehabilitation services, and for 
outpatient medical specialists such as gynecologists, ophthalmologists, pediatricians and 
psychiatrists. The waiting times for public system dentists, GPs and certain elective surgery 
operations are often long. A recent study from the metropolitan area of Finland found that 
private services – often covered by VPHI – actually offer a parallel system for children’s 
ambulatory health care services (Järvelin, Virta, Mikkola 2015). 
The absence of complementary insurance in Norway and Sweden can be explained 
by the fact that services that often are covered by complementary insurance are not part of 
the public system. Dental treatments for adults and opticians are leading examples. These 
services are characterized by ex-ante moral hazard and no private insurance companies have 
entered this market. Another reason is that the governments in Norway and Sweden heavily 
subsidize some services that often face high co-payments, and thus are candidates for 
complementary VPHI. Prescription drugs are examples of such services. 
Duplicate VPHI exists in all Nordic countries, and is the main VPHI that is offered 
in Norway and Sweden. This type of coverage is meant to overcome the challenges of 
limited capacity and long waiting times by providing faster access to examination and 
treatments. It should however be noted that the expansion of (duplicate) VPHI has taken 
place at a time when waiting times were reduced in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden 
(Siciliani et al, 2013). The waiting time for surgery has for example been reduced from 
about 12 weeks in 2001 to less than 8 weeks in 2011 in Denmark (Christiansen and Bech, 
2013). In Norway the picture is different as (median) somatic care waiting times have 
increased since 2005, but been stable within psychiatric care (Kalseth et al., 2010). 
Another rationale for purchasing VPHI is to expand the choice of providers beyond 
the public sector. However the Nordic countries have implemented reforms that increase 
the choice of providers irrespectively of VPHI. These reforms were originally set up to 
provide choice within the public system, but are later expanded to also include private 
providers: The extended free choice of hospital was introduced in Denmark in 2002 
(Sundhedsloven, 2011). In Sweden, the “Choice of provider”-policy came into force in 1st  
July 2003 (Regeringen, 2002). From January 1st 2015, the new Patient law (2014:821) 
introduced in Sweden gives individuals a free choice nationally for all primary care and 
outpatient specialist care service offered by county councils. The current provisions for 
referrals as applies in the county council of residence determine which services are 
provided. This means that most Swedes have the possibility to access for example private 
specialist providers in the Stockholm areas without a referral for outpatient services. In 
Finland, the Health Care Act in 2010 extended the freedom of choice for both primary and 
hospital care to cover municipally operated or commissioned private health care units in the 
entire country in 201411. The Finnish PHI has always offered free choice of provider but in 
the municipal system the choice has traditionally been more limited (Tynkkynen, 2016.) 
Finally, in Norway the free choice of provider is expanded to include private for-profit 
providers that do not have a contractual relationship with the regional health care authorities 
                                                 
11 In practice however, the choice has not played a major role in the municipal system since there are in many 
places problems with access and continuity of care. Finland has had the PHI system parallel to the municipal 
system already for 50 years. In this sense people have always had an extensive choice if they are able and 
willing to pay the high co-payments. 
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(Administrative regulation 29. October 2015). Hence, when it comes to the increased choice 
of providers, most patients have the choice of treatment in the private sector irrespectively 
of VPHI. It seems that VPHI thus has little to offer to counteract limited choice. 
There might however be other potential advantages of duplicate VPHI seen from the 
patient perspective. Patients covered by PHI and/or VPHI in Finland can directly access 
private specialist care without referrals from a primary care physician. Moreover, Anell 
(2014) indicates that patients can benefit from the fact that insurers in Sweden usually pay 
private providers based on fee-for-services, whereas public providers are usually payed 
from county councils based on capitation (primary care) or more or less tight budgets 
(specialist care). It is well known that fee-for-services reduce the incentives to under-
provide services, i.e. select treatments and examinations only on the ground of costs. VPHI 
can also provide additional benefits for patient in terms of direct access to specialist care. 
In spite of the number of positive claims discussed above there are also potential 
problems associated with VPHI that should not be overlooked. Earlier evidence on 
determinants of the propensity to purchase VPHI find that higher socio-economic statues 
(income, education, social class and employment status) are significant, while observable 
health measures typically are not (e.g. Cameron et al., 1988; van Doorslaer et al, 2004). 
Furthermore, most studies find that, after controlling for adverse selection, VPHI increases 
health care consumption due to moral hazard (e.g., Hurd and McGarry, 1997 and Jones et 
al, 2006). Hence, VPHI might be detrimental for welfare as it is bought primary by low risk 
patients and does not eliminate (ex post) moral hazard. Future research should investigate 
if this is the case also in the Nordic countries.  
Nevertheless, duplicate private insurance can potentially contribute to higher quality 
of care when private insurers provide financial incentives for the provider to improve their 
performance or when the insurers selectively contract with the most effective and competent 
providers. However, despite these potential benefits that may arise from duplicate VPHI, it 
can be argued that the main contribution of VPHI is related to complementary covering of 
co-payments. In this aspect VPHI should be valued high in the Nordic countries where there 
are strong preferences for equal access to health care. However, in reality the effects of 
VPHI appear to depend on the way the health system in organized and financed.  
We believe a country’s specific institutional health care setting shape the market for 
VPHI. Future research should take a more explorative approach to investigate how the 
combination of limited capacity, increased use of out-of-pocket payments, and rationing 
though waiting times have shaped the markets for VPHI in the Nordic countries. Other areas 
of future research include the implications for population access, the existing regulatory 
framework related to VPHI, the development of contracts between insurers and providers 
and payments to providers, and studies of the use of VPHI and for what reasons.  
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